

APPRAISING THE CAPACITY OF THE ROLE OF MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK-FREE OPERATIONS IN COMBATING TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY IN MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE LAKE CHAD BASIN COMMISSION

Elizabeth Aishatu BATURE¹ PhD Usman SOLOMON² & Abiye Bennett IRINGE – KOKO³

ABSTRACT

The African Union Peace and Security Council (APSA) authorised the deployment of a Multinational Joint Task Force and Counterinsurgency Force against insurgents and other allied terrorist groups in the Lake Chad Basin under the political leadership of the Lake Chad Basin Commission. The mandate was to rid the region of insurgency and create a safe and secure environment in the affected areas. This effort resulted in a protracted conflict between the MNJTF and the insurgents that has lingered for over a decade with attendant fatalities and humanitarian consequences. Based on the aforementioned, this paper appraised the counterinsurgency operations of the MNJTF within their subsisting mandate. Dwelling largely on qualitative research technique. The paper discussed using a military offensive to secure the insurgents affected areas and has moved into the second phase, which is the stabilisation of the affected areas. Despite the progress so far, certain fundamental constraints and challenges are hindering the mission's efforts. The paper recommends increased funding and resources, addressing the root cause of terrorism, collaborative approach as possible ways of curbing the menace. In sum, it appraises the capacity of the multinational joint task free operations in combating terrorism and insurgency in member countries of the Lake Chad Basin Commission.

Keywords: *Lake Chad Basin Commission. MNJTF, insurgency, terrorism, counterinsurgency.*

Introduction

The history of Lake Chad is closely tied to the management of its natural resources, a story replete with elements that reflect its uniqueness. In the days of the great empires (Kanem-Bornu, Baguirmi Waddai, Mandara, Sokoto Caliphate), Lake Chad was an important trading centre between Central and Northern Africa. The beginning of European explorations marked a milestone in this history. The British, French, and German explorations attracted foreign yearnings to the lake.

¹ Elizabeth Aishatu BATURE¹ PhD is with the Department of Political Science Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Lizaishatu@gmail.com

² Usman SOLOMON is with the Department of Political Science Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna.

³ Abiye Bennett IRINGE – KOKO is with the Department of Political Science Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna.

Nevertheless, faced with Rabah, who had built an empire there, the matter proved more difficult than expected. In this light, a European coalition was set up (Obada, 2003). Once Rabah had been neutralised, the European powers proceeded to share the Lake Chad basin. Thus, the lake was opened up to navigation and became an international space with three (3) spheres of influence (British, French, and German). However, at the end of the First World War (1914-1918), France and Britain, having vanquished Germany, divided the space into two (2) and began to push a colonial-style development model in the region. By the period when African States of the basin had achieved independence in the 1960s (Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad), they set up the LCBC in 1964. It marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of the Chadian basin and the management of Lake Chad's natural resources.

The Institutional history of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) began with the four (4) riparian countries (Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria) when the Conventional Basin covered 430,000 km². It was expanded to 970,000 square kilometres with the accession of the Central African Republic in 1994 as the fifth member country, also taking into account the upstream areas formed by the Chari-Logone and Komadugu-Yobe active basins, followed by the accession of Libya in 2007. Over a long time in history, the Lake Chad Basin appears to have been a key centre of trade between North and Central Africa. In less than a quarter of a century, new economic resources (industrial, agricultural mining, etc.) are creating a new type of space differentiation, high population mobility, and the emergence of intercommunity conflicts tied to these new dynamics. The violent conflict in the Lake Chad Basin has continuously deteriorated. Boko Haram raids and suicide bombings targeting civilians are causing widespread trauma, preventing people from accessing essential services, and destroying vital infrastructure. It is assumed that what Boko Haram is today is the result of endogenous and exogenous factors, largely related to the MNJTF's response to terrorism (Suberu, 2009). This means that the intensity and changing patterns of counter-terrorist operations may have heightened the level of terrorist activity along the Nigerian border in the Lake Chad region (Olawoyin et al., 2021). This has led to the displacement of a large number of people living in the affected areas across the four Lake Chad countries. Most of the displaced families are sheltered by communities that count among the world's poorest and most vulnerable. In addition, the destruction of public infrastructures, closure of commercial businesses, violation of fundamental human rights, food insecurity, and malnutrition in the affected region have reached critical levels. (Ibekwe & Nosiri 2023)

Conceptual Clarifications

Terrorism

Terrorism evokes divergent meanings. The concept has proved controversial. Various legal systems and government agencies use different definitions of terrorism. Terrorism can mean a mystique child of intimidation, injustice or lack of fair hearing, emasculation of the opposition, forced democratisation, ethnic distrust, economic exploitation and poverty, clash of civilisation, cultural and religious variations, bad governance or dictatorship, political oppression, ethnic

discrimination and marginalisation of minority tribes by the major ethnic governments, religious persecution, cultural domination, anarchism, war sadism among others (Walker, 2012). Essentially, most governments are often to be held accountable for Terrorism attacks against their nationals, just like the fragile case of the Niger Delta and Northeast.

As cited by Chailiand and Blin (2016), Lenin submits that the purpose of terrorism is to terrorise. It is the only way a small country or people can hope to take on a great nation and have any chance of winning. Terror, therefore, becomes a “symbolic act designed to influence political behaviour by extra normal means, entailing the use or threat of violence” (Roger, 2020). The general contention about terrorism as a weapon of the weak (Chinelo, 2016) has now become contentious with the emergence of the phenomena of state terrorism and state sponsored terrorism.

Russett et al. (2006) have attempted to make a distinction between the traditional (what they refer to as “dissident”) form of terrorism, state (what they refer to as “establishment”) terrorism, and state-sponsored terrorism. According to them, state terrorism is the use of terror by the state “against their populations to gain or increase control through fear. Tactics (used in this case) include expulsion or exile, failure to protect some citizens from the crimes of others (as in state tolerated vigilante groups), arbitrary arrest, beatings, kidnappings (disappearances), torture, and murder”, while state sponsored terrorism means “international terrorist activity conducted by states or, more often, the support of terrorist groups through the provision of arms, training, safe haven, or financial backing.” Terrorism is seldom mindless rather, it is usually a calculated use of violence or leverage. However, motives and means vary widely, having common only that some actors use violence to influence other actors. The primary effect of terrorism is psychological. In part, the effectiveness of terrorism in capturing attention is due to the dramatic nature of the incidents, especially as shown on television news. Terrorism also gains attention because of the randomness of victims.

Insurgency

The term Insurgency often conjures widely disparate interpretations, suffering at the hands of both experts and pundits. Commonly accepted meanings remain elusive, with predictable conceptual confusion. Insurgency continues to be used interchangeably and imprecisely with irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, revolutionary warfare, guerrilla warfare, and even terrorism. Insurgents, similarly, have been called guerrillas, terrorists, revolutionaries, extremists, and irregulars. The interchangeability of terms is understandable, given the diverse nature and adaptability of those who wage insurgency and the overlapping traits of these types of conflicts. According to Drew (2001:2), the US military considers peacekeeping, terrorism/counterterrorism, and insurgency/counter-insurgency as low-intensity conflicts. This study disputes the inclusion of some of these terms within the definition of low-intensity conflicts. Terrorism, for instance, is a tactic rather than a kind of warfare, and it is a tactic that can be used in any conflict. The same holds for counter-terrorism. Peacekeeping missions have as their objective the prevention of conflict rather than the prosecution of conflict.

Clausewitz (1976) described insurgent warfare perfectly when he said that war is a political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 87). Insurgents employ guerrilla and terrorist tactics, espouse revolutionary and radical causes, pose asymmetric threats to modern conventional forces, operate on the legal and moral margins of societies, and blur distinctions between civilians and combatants. The very use of the term Insurgency creates legal confusion, as it infers a level of legitimacy that can pose political problems to ruling governments and Counter-Insurgent forces.

Counter-insurgency (COIN)

Counter-insurgency is a military strategy to combat insurgencies. It involves the combination of military, political, economic, and social measures aimed at undermining the support base of the insurgents and restoring stability to the affected area. Counterinsurgency heavily relies on the specialised capabilities of the works of intelligence and counter intelligence sector. Its central goals are always prevention, disruption, and prevention of terrorist activities and networks) (Stepanova,2003).

Counter-insurgency is any deliberate action taken by a state against the activities of an insurgent group with the aim of defeating or undermining its progress. According to Tafida (2020, p.192), “Counter-insurgency is a coordinated action of the state towards addressing gaps in the forms of societal problems on which insurgents capitalise.” It also stands for a war waged within a state by the government using the instrument of state power in a combination of military, political, economic, civil, legal, and psychological means against the ideas and activities of an insurgent (Tafida, 2020, p. 192). Insurgent groups are usually opportunistic; they often exploit and take advantage of some existing societal problems like poverty, ignorance, and inadequacies in government to draw support and win membership, and they also lure youths and other vulnerable groups with inducement as a means of recruitment of members. The ongoing military operation in northeast Nigeria, as well as the involvement of the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad area, is a good example.

Collective Security Theory

The theory of collective security sprouted out of Liberal institutionalism that views the international system as one based on the community of states with the potential to cooperate to overcome mutual problems (Goldstein and Pevernhouse, 2011 & Galadima, 2006). Collective Security Theory was pioneered by Baha’u’llah, Micheal Joseph Savage, Martin Wight, Immanuel Kant, and Woodrow Wilson and was deemed to apply interests in security in a broad manner to avoid grouping powers into opposing camps and refusing to draw dividing lines that would leave anyone out.

Collective Security Theory is a liberal theory of international relations in that it emphasises venues of cooperation and mutual obligation. States enter multilateral agreements to refrain from attacking one another and also for economic relations, but within an overarching organisation to which they owe allegiance. According to the theory, pledging to an international organisation will create a more stable commitment than a large, confusing set of bilateral.

Collective Security is a system in which states cooperate to maintain peace and security. It is based on the idea that an attack on one state is an attack on all states and that all states have a responsibility to come to the aid of a state that is attacked. Collective security is a system of international relations in which states agree to come to the aid of each other in the event of an attack. The theory behind collective security is that if all states know that they will face the combined opposition of all other states if they attack, they will be less likely to resort to aggression. Collective security systems can be either formal or informal. Treaties or other international agreements create formal collective security systems. The most well-known example of a formal collective security system is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO members have agreed to come to the aid of any member state that is attacked (Goldstein, 2016).

Collective Security refers to the formation of a broad alliance of most major actors in an international system for the purpose of jointly opposing aggression by an actor (Goldstein & Pevenhouse, 2011). Collective Security is also seen as a formal commitment among groups of countries in order to protect the security interest of the individual members within their joint spheres of interest (Aleksovski et al., 2014). It is also explained to mean an arrangement by which all member states agree, as a collective, to reverse any threat posed by an outsider against any of its member states (Gebresilassie, 2012).

Galadima (2006) identified three models of collective security; the first is the Kantian or Wistonian collective security model, which is seen as an arrangement among states for effective actions against any aggressor from within that community of states. The second is the intervention, usually undertaken by a coalition of states, against international aggression or internal conflict or disorder with the explicit or implicit approval of the United Nations. The third model is collective security, which concerns an intervention by a single state or a coalition of states against international aggression, internal conflict, or disorder without the approval of the United Nations Security Council.

Under collective security, states agree to abide by certain norms and rules to maintain stability and, when necessary, bond together to stop aggression (Kupchan & Kupchan, 1995), this stems from the realisation that the security threats confronting nations in contemporary times are such that may not be solved by states acting alone, hence the need for synergy of capacity and strategy (Bolaji, 2010). It is believed that stability (of any region) is the product of cooperation (Kupchan & Kupchan, 1995) the essence of collective security is to combat present threats to peace and stability. In a system of collective security, an enemy that is the aggressor is a threat to regional or international peace and security and would be isolated and would have to face the organised power of the whole international community (Aleksovski et al., 2014, & Andretta, 1996).

Understanding the Multinational Joint Task Force Operations

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is a military force consisting of personnel from Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and the Republic of Benin (the latter joined as a non-member state under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC)). In 1994, the Commission

established the Multinational Joint Security Force (MNJSF), which was solely a Nigerian affair (Galeazzi et al., 2017; Mahmood & Ani, 2018)

The mandate of the MNJSF was to police the northeastern region against armed banditry, which resulted from the Chadian civil war, and to promote the free movement of persons and goods across the borders (Albert, 2017). In 1998, the force became multinational, incorporating military units from Chad and Niger, while Cameroon joined in 2012. Its mandate was to deal with shared cross-border security problems and conduct military operations against arms dealers and terrorist groups in the region (Kindzeka, 2014; Musa, 2013).

Though the force was established in 1994, it assumed an active role in the management of the Boko Haram crisis only in 2012, when the neighbouring states became involved as well. The reaction to Boko Haram's capture of territories in Borno State, as well as the threat of their further expansion in the Lake Chad region, made it necessary for the member states to revisit the mandate of the force in order to focus on the insurgency. Hence, in 2014, the MNJSF was reactivated and renamed the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). This was determined by the LCBC heads of state and governments at the extraordinary summit of the member states and the Republic of Benin in Niamey, Niger. The mandate of the MNJTF is to create a safe and secure environment in the areas affected by insurgency, full restoration of state authority, and the return of internally displaced people and refugees (African Union, 2015). Recognising the complexity of the MNJTF mission, three components made up of the military, police, and civilian personnel were established, and four sector commands were defined. Sector 1 command is located in Mora (northern Cameroon), sector 3 command in the town of Baga-Sola (western Chad), sector 3 command in Baga (northeast Borno, Nigeria), and Sector 4 command in the town of Diffa (Southeastern Niger) (Assanvo et al., 2016). Since the inception of the MNJTF, Nigeria has continued to take the leading role in security and military endeavours in the Lake Chad region. The reorganisation of the force led to an increase in the operational capacity of the MNJTF to an estimated 10,000 troops, initially provided by Nigeria; its commanders came from the Nigerian army as well (Galeazzi et al., 2017; Zamfir, 2017).

Military Cooperation in the Lake Chad Basin

The Multinational Joint Task Force Military cooperation in the Lake Chad Basin predates the rise of Boko Haram. The fragility of the basin countries' security systems and porous borders allowed for armed groups and common banditry to flourish. In 1994, at the 8th summit of the LCBC, due to smuggling and criminal activities taking place in the area, the member states decided to establish a joint security force based in Baga-Kawa in Nigeria, however, only Nigeria committed troops at that stage (Musa, 2013). In 1998, the security force was expanded to include other member states of the LCBC by establishing the Multinational Joint Security Force (MNJSF). This formation had the "initial mandate to conduct military operations in the Lake Chad Region, check banditry activities and to facilitate free movement of member states' troops across their common border." (Musa, 2013). While the LCBC acted as a political forum, its direct involvement in these early experiences was limited. The aftermath of the 2009 "Boko Haram Uprising," which left more than

1,000 dead in Northern Nigeria, inspired the reorganisation of the MNJSF. In 2012, in response to the increasingly cross-border nature of the insurgency against Nigeria and its neighbours, the MNJSF was re-launched as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). This reorganisation led to an increase in the operational capacity of the MNJTF to an estimated 10,000 troops initially driven by Nigeria (Zamfir, 2017). The MNJTF was based in Baga, Nigeria, until Boko Haram overran the base in January 2015. Military headquarters were subsequently moved to N'Djamena, and the MNJTF was brought under the political lead of the African Union and its African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The AU mandated the LCBC to be the political coordinating body of the operation. Set up by the LCBC summit, the MNJTF only includes four of the six member states, Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad, and non-member Benin. The MNJTF members are effectively split between ECOWAS (Nigeria, Niger, and Benin) and ECCAS (Cameroon and Chad), making it difficult for an AU recognised REC, and the building block of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), to take the lead. Since the majority of the countries concerned belong to the LCBC and Boko Haram's reach had spread to the shores of the Lake Chad Basin, the organisation was seen as a suitable institutional framework for this joint effort, providing a pragmatic solution for this cross-regional arrangement. The LCBC, in theory, provides civilian leadership of the mission but de facto has no involvement in operational activities - the LCBC has little 'on the ground' expertise on peace and security.

The MNJTF is by no means an exclusive framework for cooperation, and national and bilateral deployments take place regularly. In June 2016, for example, Chad deployed 2,000 troops to Niger after Boko Haram took the town of Bosso, causing 50,000 people to flee. The MNJTF is, in the first place, a framework for coordinating different national military actions (Zamfir, 2017). Under the MNJTF, troops are deployed within the countries' national boundaries and operate within those as a matter of priority (Assanvo et al., 2016). They may, however, under specific circumstances, operate within a limited perimeter on the territory of neighbouring states. Tensions on the mandate occurred and are likely to increase. While the re-focusing on the original core mandate of water management is sometimes proposed as an option to institutionally strengthen the LCBC, the interest in security aspects has risen since the late 2000s due to the violence exerted by the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast of Nigeria, and, as of 2015, in the wider Lake Chad region. Advances in regional cooperation in security-related areas through the MNJTF could thus conceivably be coordinated under LCBC (Lemoalle & Magrin, p. 61). At the same time, however, the LCBC faces serious difficulties in fulfilling its core mandate to coordinate and promote the safeguarding and development of Lake Chad, leading the 2015 joint audit to conclude that despite existing policies and legislation, the future of Lake Chad has not been sufficiently prioritised by member states, noting an absence of institutional coordination on water resource management in the basin (Joint Environmental Audit 2015, p. 125).

Multinational Joint Task Force and the Fight Against Terrorism and Insurgency

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin is a military force composed of troops from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. It was established in 2015 to combat

the Boko Haram insurgency in the region. The MNJTF has been successful in degrading Boko Haram's capabilities and liberating territory from the group's control. However, the insurgency remains a significant threat in the Lake Chad Basin. Salihu (2016) highlighted some of the challenges facing the MNJTF in the fight against terrorism:

Boko Haram's Resilience: Boko Haram has proven to be a resilient and adaptable enemy. The group has been able to withstand military pressure and continue to carry out attacks.

Cross-border operations: Boko Haram operates in a region that spans multiple countries. This makes it difficult for the MNJTF to coordinate operations and pursue the group across borders.

Lack of Resources: The MNJTF is often underfunded and under-equipped. This can limit its ability to combat Boko Haram effectively.

Despite these challenges, the MNJTF remains a vital force in the fight against terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin. The force has made significant progress in degrading Boko Haram's capabilities and liberating territory from the group's control. Continued support for the MNJTF is essential to ensure that the region is not destabilised by terrorism.

Multinational Joint Task Force and the Insurgency: An Evaluation

The Scourge of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin In the view of Wendyam (2017), financial challenges are the major issues confronting MNJTF in ending the scourge of Boko Haram. Financial constraints have hindered the operationalisation of the MNJTF. Before it was able to occupy its current premises, the LCBC Secretariat in N'Djamena hosted its command. Similar difficulties were encountered in setting up the various MNJTF sectors of operations in the field. This weighed even more heavily on the troop-contributing countries because they were already burdened by the considerable financial costs of the human and material resources pitted against Boko Haram.

These difficulties continue to act as a constraint. Assanvo (2016) states clearly that the MNJTF commander is determined to carry out his initial budget requirements of the MNJTF, estimated at nearly US \$700 million. The financial support the MNJTF is meant to receive is not directed at the procurement of weaponry or military equipment but is instead meant to meet its logistical and material needs and cover a part of its human resources costs.

This mainly covers land and air transport requirements; secured communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and equipment for the command headquarters and the camps in the sectors. This is what the 50 million euros promised by the European Union is destined for. Freeing up this contribution has taken a long time due to administrative reasons. There are numerous challenges encountered by MNJTF in its resolve to fight Boko Haram in West Africa. Abdulbasit and Nwankpa, (2018) noted that the MNJTF has also had some significant setbacks. The first occurred between January 3 and 7, 2015, in what became known as the “Baga Massacre,”

which included the death of 2,000 civilians at the hands of Boko Haram. The massacre was due to a number of causes, including poor planning and a lack of coordination between the regional states.

Tactically and operationally, there is very little the MNJTF can do since it is only as strong as its members. It lacks both intelligence architecture and an operational standby force it could willingly deploy in counter-terrorism operations. Hence, the bureaucratic bottleneck involved in mobilising the fighting force whenever the need arises slowed down the progress of the Joint Task Force and its efficiency in the face of Boko Haram attacks.

Assanvo (2016) observed that in addition to the large loss of civilian life, the MNJTF command post of the time, located in the town of Baga, Nigeria, on the shores of Lake Chad, was completely wiped out by Boko Haram. This disastrous event left the MNJTF in disarray and confused. The lack of or insufficient resources needed for MNJTF to effectively carry out the mission of fighting Boko Haram may also impede the LCBC from doing what is expected of it. The lack of funds is as a result of LCBC's reliance and dependence on its member states and donors, especially now that Nigeria, which has been bearing the largest cost of various ECOWAS missions, now has its resources overstretched with the activities of Boko Haram. Nigeria's neighbours like Cameroon and Chad, who are also affected by the terrorist activities, do belong to LCBC but do not belong to ECOWAS, the regional organisation, which means that there is a need for a transnational response rather than only LCBC.

Conclusion

As LCBC reforms its military and reshapes its strategy to restore security, government and military leaders effectively need to prioritise policies to protect civilians. The pre-eminence of protecting the "civilian" against threats must be the defining element of the LCBC. The acquiescence to bloodletting in the Northeast must end immediately. Civil society organisations, with support from grassroots media, can play an important role in creating public information campaigns and facilitating a national dialogue to humanise the conflict, thereby shifting the views of all Nigerians toward a mindset of protection.

At its most basic level, the key to counter-insurgency rests in protecting the population and gaining their trust. This research confirms that government legitimacy and effectiveness will be critical to addressing the underlying issues that give rise to Boko Haram. If the LCBC governments and armed forces are unable to maintain legitimacy and improve protection, their overarching mission will be undermined. To deliver on this mission, security forces like the MNJTF must be properly funded and backed up with the political will both nationally and internationally in order to effectively carry out its mandate with ultimate and sustainable success, peace, and security of the region and her citizenries.

Recommendations

Some of the ways that the MNJTF can be strengthened to more effectively combat terrorism:

a. Increased funding and resources: The MNJTF needs more funding and resources to combat insurgency effectively. This includes funding for training, equipment, and operations. Improved

coordination and cooperation: The MNJTF needs to improve coordination and cooperation between its member states. This includes sharing intelligence, conducting joint operations, and developing common strategies.

b. Addressing the root causes of terrorism: The MNJTF needs to address the root causes of terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin. This includes promoting economic development, improving governance, and providing education and job opportunities for young people. By addressing these challenges, the MNJTF can be strengthened to combat terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin more effectively. Additional challenges facing the MNJTF in the fight against terrorism.

c. Member states should implement ECOWAS mechanisms for fighting terrorism. These include the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) as well as the very important ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan adopted in 2013.

d. There should be a collaborative and cooperative regional approach that would be the most effective way of denying safe havens to the terrorists while strengthening those countries' military capabilities to face and defeat Boko Haram.

e. Pledging troops and platforms alone would not defeat Boko Haram without adequately funding the operations of the MNJTF. Member countries of the LCBC must fulfil their financial obligations to the force. Financial assistance from other supporting organisations like the UN, AU, and EU, as well as other developed countries such as Britain, France, and the United States of America, should be judiciously made use of to cover the operations, logistics, and remuneration of personnel welfare.

f. It is equally essential that the fight against insurgency be complemented forthwith by development policies in the affected regions. Without them, this criminal movement will continue to thrive on poverty and the feeling of exclusion that feeds it. France, too, is involved in that effort; the President of the Republic launched a Lake Chad initiative, which the French Development Agency has implemented at the regional level. Since terrorism may not be fought by military might alone, even though various efforts are being made in that direction by the Nigerian government and the Multinational Joint Task Force, the MNJTF should seek alternative and nonmilitary options in dealing with the insurgents.

References

- Andreatta, F. (1996). Collective security: theory and practice of an institution for peace in the xx century. PhD dissertation, International Relations Department, London School of Economics and Political Science
- Aleksovski, A. et al., 2014: Collective Security – The Role of International Organizations – Implications in International Security Order. Retrieved on 16th September 2024. DOI: 10.5901/miss.2014.v5n27p274

- Assanvo, W. Abatan J & Sawadogo, a (2016). West Africa Report Issue 19 | September 2016: Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko haram Retrieved: <https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/west-africa-report-issue-19-september-2024-assessing-multinational-joint-task-force>.
- Abdulbasit and Nwankpa, (2018). *The Boko Haram Reader. From Nigerian Preachers to the Islamic State*. Hurst & Company, London, 2018. ISBN: 978-1-8490-4884-2.
- Babangana, A. (2012). The Impacts of Global Climate Change in Africa: Lake Chad, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Retrieved from <http://www.volunteeractioncounts.org/en/testimonials/website-visitors-stories/item/1409-the-impacts-of-global-climate-change-in-africa-the-lake-chad-adaptation-and-vulnerability.html>
- Chaliand, G. & Blin, A. (2016). 9. Lenin, Stalin, and State Terrorism. In G. Chaliand (Ed.), *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to ISIS* (pp. 197-207). Berkeley: University of California Press. <https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520966000-011>
- Chinelo, (2016). The Specter of Terrorism and Nigeria's Industrial Development: A Multi-Stakeholder Imperative. *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies*, 9(1), 22–25.
- Clausewitz, C.V1976). Clausewitz, and the Sociology of War. *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol 45, No 4 (Dec 1994. Pg 619 - 636
- Drew, D. (2001). *Insurgency And Counterinsurgency*: Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5532
- Goldstein, G. (2010). *International Relations: 7th Edition* Pearson Publishers. Boston Longman
- Gebresilassie, Fiseha Haftetsion (2012) "Collective Security at Stake? Challenges of the current Collective Security System" www.aigaforum.com p.1-12 Accessed 16th September 2024
- Galeazzi et al., M.A 2017: *The Multinational Joint Task Force and Nigerian Counter-Terrorism Operations in the Lake Chad Region*. Retrieved: <https://doi.org/10.12775/CJPS.2021.006>
- Goldstein, G. (2016). *International Relations 9th Edition* Pearson publishers
- Goldstein, J. S & Pevehouse, J. C (2011). *International Relations 9th Edition* Boston Longman
- Galadima, H. B. (2006). *Sub-regional Security co-operation and conflict management in West Africa: the ECOMOG experience*. PhD thesis submitted to the department of Political Science, University of Jos.
- Ibekwe, E. O., & Nosiri, U. D. (2023). Counter Terrorism: An Assessment Of Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in Combating Boko Haram Insurgency in the Lake Chad Region. *African Journal of Social and Behavioural Sciences*, 13(2). Retrieved from <https://journals.aphriapub.com/index.php/AJSBS/article/view/2324>
- Kindzeka, M.E., (2014). 'Lake Chad Countries Agree on Military Task Force amid Insecurity,' 18 March, Voice of America News, <http://www.voanews.com/a/lake-chad-countries-agree-on-military-taskforce-amid-insecurity/1873650.html>.
- Kupchan, C.A & Kupchan C.A. (1995). The promise of collective security. *International security*, 20(1). MIT. 52-61
- Magrin,Geraud Denis; Lemoalle,Jacques; Lajaunie,Marie-Laure Main report (English).

- The Lake Chad Development and Climate Resilience Action Plan (Vol. 2): Main report (English)*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/489801468186879029/Main-report-Joint-Environmental-Audit-2015>, p. 125).
- Musa, S. (Lt. Col.). (2013). *BAGA: Multinational joint task forces, BHTs, and host community*. Sahara Reporters. <http://saharareporters.com/2013/05/07/baga-multinational-joint-task-forces-bhts-and-hostcommunity-lt-col-sagir-musa>
- Obada, E. (2003). Lake Chad Experience and Lessons Learned Brief. Retrieved from http://www.worldlakes.org/uploads/chad_draft_10.29.03.pdf
- Olawoyin, K. W., Akinrinde, O. O., & Irabor, P. O. (2021). The Multinational Joint Task Force and Nigerian counter-terrorism operations in the Lake Chad Region. *The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies*, (1), pp. 115–135.
- Roger (2020) Intelligence in national security enterprise: An Introduction. George Town University Press.
- Salihu N. (2015). The center can hold: Toward a regional approach to combating West Africa's terrorist policy brief 1/July 2015. Accra: KAIPTC.
- Stepanova, E. (2003). *Anti-terrorism and peace-building during and after conflict* (pp. 10-36). Stockholm.
- Tafida, M. L. (2020). Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: A Critical Examination of the Counterinsurgency Strategy in Northeast Nigeria. *Studies in Politics and Society*, 9(1&2)
- Walker, A. (2012). What is Boko Haram? United States Institute of Peace, June. 5.
- Zamfir, I. (2017). Regional Efforts to Fight Boko Haram. European Parliamentary Research Service.